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Abstract: Post-growth economists propose structural changes towards labour-intensive services, such
as care or education, to make our economy more sustainable by providing meaningful work and
reducing the environmentally damaging production of material goods. Our study investigates the
assumption underlying such proposals. Using a multi-regional input-output model we compare the
embodied energy intensity and embodied labour productivity across economic sectors in the UK and
Germany between 1995 and 2011. We identify five labour-intensive service sectors, which combine
low embodied energy intensity with low growth in embodied labour productivity. However, despite
their lower embodied energy intensities, our results indicate that large structural changes towards
these sectors would only lead to small reductions in energy footprints. Our results also suggest that
labour-intensive service sectors in the UK have been characterised by higher rates of price inflation
than other sectors. This supports suggestions from the literature that labour-intensive services face
challenges from increasing relative prices and costs. We do not find similar results for Germany,
which is the result of low overall growth in embodied labour productivity and prices. This highlights
that structural change is closely associated with economic growth, which raises the question of how
structural changes can be achieved in a non-growing economy.
Keywords: post-growth economics; degrowth; structural change; energy footprint; multiregional
input-output databases
1. Introduction
Sustainable development requires us to “meet the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” [1] and this principle has been enshrined
in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals [2]. However, human activities are currently
breaching several planetary boundaries, threatening to destroy the ecological life-support systems of
our planet for future generations [3,4]. These planetary boundaries represent thresholds in Earth-system
processes “which, if crossed, could generate unacceptable environmental change” (p. 472) [3]. Avoiding
large-scale environmental crises will require the elimination of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
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significant reductions in energy use and material throughput, as well as the reversal of trends in
land-use change and biodiversity loss over the space of mere decades [5,6]. The critical challenge of
sustainability is therefore how we can provide for human needs while reversing our environmental
impacts to stay within the planetary boundaries [7].
One of the key drivers of environmental degradation has been the growth in economic activities,
measured by GDP [8,9]. Therefore, ecological economists propose that we have to transform the
economies of developed countries towards post-growth approaches to address the sustainability
challenge [10]. Such post-growth economies are defined as economies that prioritise the reduction
of environmental impacts and the enhancements of other measures of prosperity over GDP growth.
Similar proposals have been discussed under different names such as degrowth [11,12] or a steady-state
economy [13,14]. While these approaches feature some important differences, we focus on their
commonalities in this study and will therefore refer to them collectively as post-growth approaches.
One important part of the proposed strategies for achieving the post-growth economy is structural
change in economic output and employment away from material production and consumption and
towards labour-intensive services such as education, care or repair [15,16]. Labour-intensive services
are considered to be those services where the value of the service provided is inextricably linked to
the labour time invested, so that it is difficult or undesirable to increase labour productivity in these
services. We distinguish such labour-intensive services from labour-light services that feature a higher
potential for labour productivity growth, such as communication services. The objective for such a
structural change towards labour-intensive services in a post-growth economy is three-fold [10]. Firstly,
these labour-intensive services are important for human flourishing and can provide meaningful jobs.
Secondly, it is considered that such labour-intensive services have lower environmental impact than
material goods. Thirdly, as it is undesirable and difficult to improve labour productivity in such service
sectors, they can reduce the threat of unemployment in a non-growing economy. However, so far, there
has been very little empirical investigation in the post-growth economics literature of which sectors
in the economy show the characteristics of labour-intensive services and whether structural changes
towards such sectors can contribute to the desired objectives.
In this study, we address this gap in the literature by investigating the relationship between the
embodied final energy intensity and embodied labour productivity across economic demand sectors in
the UK and Germany. The adoption of a supply-chain perspective, which allows us to examine the
embodied energy and labour inputs, is one of the key novelties of our analysis. To our knowledge, we
provide the first study that compares embodied energy intensity and embodied labour productivity at a
sectoral level, although there are a few examples of similar approaches used to examine the relationship
between embodied labour and GHG intensities [17–19]. The supply-chain approach, which is based on
input-output analysis, takes into account the labour and energy inputs along the whole global supply
chain of sectors. We refer to the calculated measures as ‘embodied’ energy intensity and ‘embodied’
labour productivity of different demand sectors, to distinguish them from conventional measures,
which we will refer to as ‘direct’ energy intensity and labour productivity. We consider a supply-chain
perspective important for investigating structural change for a post-growth transition, because it
allows us to examine whether changes in energy intensity and labour productivity are consistent with
the overall goals of the post-growth economy. For example, a conventional perspective cannot show
whether changes in direct energy intensity or direct labour productivity in specific sectors have been
achieved at the expense of changes in energy or labour inputs in other parts of the supply chain.
Using a supply chain perspective has a long tradition in ecological economics for the calculation of
energy, GHG and material footprints associated with the final demand in a particular country [20–23].
Supply chain approaches have also been used in the economics literature on structural change, for
example, to investigate the implications of diverging levels of embodied labour-productivity in different
sectors for overall economic stability [24,25]. Our study combines these two strands of literature.
Our approach allows us to investigate three important topics regarding the assumptions and
feasibility of structural change towards labour-intensive services for a post-growth economy. Firstly,
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it is generally assumed that service sectors, including labour-intensive services, have a lower energy
intensity than other sectors. There is evidence that this is the case when measuring the direct
energy intensity without taking into account the supply chain [26,27]. However, it is debated how
much structural changes towards service sectors in developed countries over the past decades have
contributed to reducing the overall energy intensity of economies [27,28]. We investigate whether the
assumption of lower energy intensity in service sectors holds when a supply-chain perspective is used.
In addition, we estimate a second measure of energy use that we consider relevant from a post-growth
perspective, namely the embodied energy-labour ratio. We use these measures to answer our first
research question:
1. Do service sectors have a lower embodied energy intensity and a lower embodied energy-labour
ratio than other sectors?
Secondly, there have been very few systematic assessments of which economic sectors show the
characteristics of labour-intensive services desirable for a post-growth economy, although Jackson [10]
lists “nutrition, education, care, maintenance and repair, recreation, craft, creativity, culture” (p. 220),
as examples. The key characteristics of the labour-intensive services promoted in the post-growth
literature are the possibility to provide meaningful jobs, low energy intensity and low rates of
labour-productivity growth [10]. For the purpose of our study, we focus on the latter two elements.
We therefore identify which sectors show the characteristics of labour-intensive services by answering
our second research question:
2. Which sectors feature low embodied energy intensity combined with low rates of growth in
embodied labour productivity?
A full discussion on which sectors and activities can be considered as labour-intensive services
desirable for a post-growth economy also requires a thorough assessment of the first characteristic,
namely whether they can provide meaningful jobs. Such an assessment is beyond the scope of this
paper as it requires careful consideration of how to define meaningful work. However, further research
conducting such assessments is very important for the development of strategies for a post-growth
economy. Mair and Druckman [29] provide a good example of research assessing the potential of the
health care sector to provide meaningful jobs.
Thirdly, it has been proposed that labour-intensive services face an economic disadvantage
compared to other sectors due to Baumol’s cost disease. The theory of Baumol’s cost disease, proposed
by William Baumol and co-authors [30–33], suggests that sectors with low labour productivity growth
rates face relative cost and price increases compared to sectors with high labour productivity growth
rates. While Baumol’s theory is highly stylised, there is considerable evidence that the processes it
describes play a role in shaping the economy in the US [34], the EU [35,36], South Korea [37] and
across the OECD [38,39]. While there is evidence for the existence of Baumol’s theories across these
countries and regions, the strength of the effect varies in line with different contexts. Baumol [30]
himself suggests that his theory has significant implications for the transition to a sustainable economy,
because manufacturing sectors with a high environmental impact are getting continuously cheaper
compared to the labour-intensive services with low environmental impacts. We therefore investigate
whether we can find evidence for such an effect by answering our third research question:
3. Do sectors with low embodied energy intensity and low rates of growth in embodied labour
productivity also have higher rates of price inflation compared to other sectors?
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Calculating Embodied Energy Intensity and Embodied Labour Productivity
For our purposes, we define the embodied energy intensity, tE,I, in each sector i as the ratio of
the supply chain inputs of energy, gE,i, and the monetary final demand that is spent in this sector, yi
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(Equation (1)). For embodied labour productivity, pL,i, we divide the monetary final demand that is
spent in this sector, yi, by the supply chain inputs of labour, gL,i (Equation (2)). We define the embodied
energy labour ratio in each sector, ri, as the ratio of the supply chain inputs of energy, gE,I, and the
supply chain inputs of labour, gL,i (Equation (3)).
tE,i =
gE,i
yi
(1)
pL,i =
yi
gL,i
(2)
ri =
gE,i
gL,i
(3)
For convenience, we will refer to gE,i and gL,i as energy and labour footprints of the relevant
sectors. The footprints measure the energy and labour inputs that are used in all stages along the
supply chain of a certain end-product. For example, the energy footprint of the UK demand for goods
from the vehicles sector includes any energy that is used around the world in the supply chain, such as
any energy used to produce the required steel in China or car parts in Eastern Europe.
We obtain the energy and labour footprints for all sectors of final demand in the UK and Germany
using the standard approach based on multi-regional input-output analysis [40,41]. Calculating
the energy and labour footprints requires three elements of monetary data that we obtain from the
multi-regional input-output (MRIO) database EXIOBASE [42]. Figure 1 shows a graphic representation
of an MRIO database and the three elements. The first element is a vector that includes the total
economic output for each sector in each country (x). This output represents the sum of all sales,
including to intermediate and final demand. The second element is the flow matrix Z that contains
the flow of money from each sector in each country to all other sectors in all countries. These flows
represent the intermediate inputs in the production process. In our case, Z represents a square matrix
with i number of rows and j number of columns, where i and j are equal to the number of sectors.
The third element is a relevant vector of final demand (y) for which we want to calculate the energy or
labour footprint. The vector y gives the sum of global final consumption expenditure by households,
non-profit organisations and the government, as well as gross fixed capital formation, changes in
inventories and changes in valuables for each sector.
The total output in each sector, xi, is equal to the sum of final demand in the sector yi and all the
intermediate inputs the sector delivers to other sectors, i.e., the row elements of Z (Equation (4)).
xi = zi,1 + zi,2 + . . . zi, j + yi (4)
To obtain the footprints, we firstly need to calculate how much of the economic output from each
sector in each country is part of the supply chain for the different demand sectors in each country. This
means that we need to express x as a function of y. To do so we define a matrix A, with the same
dimensions as Z, that expresses the total intermediate inputs in each sector, recorded in Z, as a fraction
of the total output created in the sector, given in x. The elements of A are given by Equation (5).
ai, j =
zi, j
x j
(5)
We can use Equation (5) to substitute the elements of Z in Equation (4) and obtain in matrix notation:
x = Ax + y (6)
Now Equation (6) can be rearranged to express x as a function of y:
x = (I−A)−1y = Ly (7)
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where I is the identity matrix and L is usually referred to as the Leontief inverse.
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Equation (7) can tell us how much economic output from diff rent sectors around the world is
embodied in the supply chain of the final demand in different sectors and countries. We can calculate
the energy and labour footprints of those final demand sectors by using information on the energy
and labour intensity of output in different sectors and different countries that are part of the supply
chain. Such extension vectors constitute the fourth element needed for the calculation. The vector
fE describes the total inputs of energy in each sector in each country. We can divide this by the total
output of each sector, x, to obtain the output intensity of energy in each sector (e).
e = fExˆ−1 (8)
A vector with a “hat” (ˆ) represents a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements are the elements
of the vector. We can multiply both sides of Equation (7) with e to obtain:
fE = eLy (9)
To calculate the footprints, we can obtain a flow matrix FE by diagonalising e and y:
FE = eˆLyˆ (10)
The flow matrix has the same dimensions as Z. Each column of FE shows the supply-chain energy
inputs associated with the final demand for the corresponding sector. Summing the columns of FE
gives the vector that contains the energy footprints associated with each sector of final demand, gE.
To obtain labour footprints, gL, the same procedure is employed but using a vector fL that describes
the total labour inputs and provides a flow matrix FL.
To calculate rates, change of over time in prices and intensities we fit a log-linear regression model
to the relevant variable over the whole time period to obtain the compound rate of growth in the
variable as suggested by Gujarati [44].
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2.2. Data Sources
We use the EXIOBASE V3.4 database [42], to obtain the relevant data of x, Z, and y for our analysis.
The database covers the period from 1995 to 2011 and represents the global economy using 44 countries
and 5 rest-of-the-world regions. EXIOBASE disaggregates the economy into 163 sectors based on
the NACE rev. 1.1 classification. However, for our purposes we aggregate all the data to a level of
70 sectors, largely by removing the very detailed sub-classifications in the sectors of agriculture, food
production, metal mining and processing and recycling. Labour inputs for each sector and region (fL)
were also obtained from EXIOBASE in the form of total hours worked in each year.
Energy inputs for MRIO analysis can be constructed in different ways representing different stages
of the energy conversion chain [41]. In this study we are interested in the relationship between energy
and labour productivity. Therefore, we focus on inputs at the final energy stage, because we consider
those to be closer to the labour inputs than energy inputs at the primary energy stage. At the time of
writing, EXIOBASE V3.4 provides a number of energy extension vectors. However, these cover only
primary energy inputs (such as primary energy supply) or final energy inputs in the form of gross
energy accounts, which cannot be used to calculate energy footprints due to double counting [42].
The final energy extension vector use in the analysis (fE) was therefore prepared by the authors (see
Section 2.4).
While EXIOBASE V3.4 covers the whole global economy, we focus on the two countries of
Germany and the UK. The reason is that there is very limited information available on final energy
consumption in the service sectors in a standardised format covering the global economy over the
time period of our analysis (see Section 2.4). As the service sectors are a special focus of our study,
we require more detailed information on sectoral final energy consumption in the service sectors
than is provided in international energy databases. In the absence of standardised information, such
detailed information can only be obtained from national data sources. While such information from
national sources is available for many countries, it requires considerable work to obtain and process
the relevant data to make it compatible with the input-output database. Obtaining and processing
such national data for more than two countries was not possible within the constraints of our study.
We chose the UK and Germany as case studies, because they represent two developed nations that
have maintained different economic models and industrial structures [45].
2.3. Preparing the Final Demand Vectors
The flow matrices FE and FL can be used to calculate the energy and labour footprints for different
subsets of the final demand vector (y). We use two different kinds of such subsets in our analysis.
Firstly, for comparing sector shares in demand and footprints, as well as comparing intensities of
sectors in current prices, we try to capture as much as possible of the energy and labour footprints of
UK and German final demand. Therefore, we use the final demand from all sources for each economic
sector in Germany and the UK respectively. Results of this analysis are presented in Section 3.1.
Secondly, to investigate the rates of change in embodied energy and labour intensities in constant
prices we only include the domestic final demand. The reason is that we require sectoral price indices
to deflate final demand. These were not available for all countries from which parts of final demand are
imported. Therefore, we only investigate the embodied intensities of the domestic components of final
demand. This includes all final demand for products in the UK and Germany where the end product is
produced domestically. It excludes final demand for imported finished products. However, footprints
of this domestic demand still include global inputs of intermediate products along the supply chain.
The results of this analysis are presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
To obtain time series of embodied energy and embodied labour productivity for domestic demand
in constant prices we first obtain the relevant intensities for each sector in current prices and then
deflate the final demand (the denominator) using a price index. For price indices we use the sectoral
implied GVA deflators for the UK and Germany provided by the Eurostat database [46]. These were
the only price indices that we could obtain in a consistent format covering all sectors in both countries
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and the whole time period. Using the price indices, we produce time series of final demand in constant
2010 prices using chained volume indices [47]. We do not convert the input-tables into constant prices,
as for example done by Lan et al. [23], because our analysis is focused on the total energy and labour
footprints in each sector and does not analyse how structural changes in the global economy change
these values over time. We therefore consider that a deflation of the input-output tables would only
add unnecessary uncertainty to our results.
All analysis was conducted at the level of the 70 sectors; we aggregate the results to 25 sectors to
reduce the uncertainty related to the footprints and for increased clarity of presentation (Table 1). After
the calculation of footprints and intensities some sectors were excluded from the presentation because
they do not feature any final energy consumption themselves. These include the energy-producing
sectors and the sector of “Private Households with Employed Persons” (see Section 2.4).
Table 1. Sector classification used for presenting results.
Sector NACE Codes (Rev. 1.1)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 01, 02, 05
Mineral Products 13, 14, 26
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15, 16
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 17, 18, 19
Paper, Printing, Publishing 21, 22
Chemicals 24
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 27, 28
Machinery, Electrical Equipment, Computers 29, 30, 31, 32, 33
Transport Equipment 34, 35
Other Manufacturing 20, 25, 36, 37
Construction 45
Wholesale and Retail Trade 50, 51, 52
Hotels and Restaurants 55
Transport 60, 61, 62, 63
Finance and Insurance 65, 66, 67
Real Estate Activities 70
IT and Communication 64, 72
Business Services 71, 73, 74
Public Administration 75
Health 85
Education 80
Other Services 41, 90, 91, 92, 93
Sectors not Presented in Results
Fuel Producers 10, 11, 23
Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas, Steam,
Hot Water 40
Private Households with Employed Persons 95
A large part of the output and final demand in the Real Estate sector consists of imputed rents
for owner-occupied housing. We remove these from the figures for output and demand in the sector
to obtain a more realistic value of the embodied labour productivity in the sector. For Germany, no
information of the share of imputed rents in the Real Estate sector was available before 2011. Therefore,
we only include the sector in the first part of the analysis, which estimates embodied energy intensities
and embodied labour productivities in 2011. We exclude the Real Estate sector from the second part of
the analysis covering the rates of change in embodied labour productivity. Any aggregate totals of
demand, energy footprints and labour footprints that are presented in the following analysis exclude
the demand for the energy-producing sectors, private households and imputed rents.
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2.4. Preparing the Energy Extension Vector
This section provides a summary of the methods and data sources used to construct the energy
extension vector. A more detailed description can be found in the supplementary information.
As outlined above, we focus on the embodied final energy in this study. Final energy use represents
any final energy carriers (e.g., petrol, natural gas, electricity) that are consumed by end users, such as
firms, households or the government. It excludes any energy that is used in the extraction of primary
energy carriers (e.g., oil and gas extraction) or in the transformation of such primary energy into
final energy (e.g., oil refineries). Final energy consumption also excludes any losses that occur in the
transformation and distribution of energy (e.g., losses in thermal power stations). For brevity we will
use the term ‘energy’ to describe final energy inputs in the reminder of this article.
As outlined above, calculating the footprints of final energy consumption requires information on
the final energy inputs into each of the EXIOBASE sectors in each region, captured in the vector fE. We
use a two-stage process to prepare the vector of energy inputs. In the first step we use data on final
energy consumption provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA, Paris, France) to construct
a complete vector fE for all countries and regions. In a second step we use national data sources to
construct more detailed vectors of energy inputs for Germany and the UK which then replace the
relevant entries for the UK and Germany in the vector produced in the first step.
For the first step, we draw on data from the IEA World Energy Balances [48], which provide
details on the total final consumption (TFC) of energy in more than 140 countries. The IEA World
Energy Statistics and Balances can be downloaded with institutional or other user licence. From TFC,
we exclude non-energy use and the energy consumption by private households for residential and
transport purposes, because our study focuses on energy inputs into economic production. This leaves
us with the relevant final energy consumption in each country disaggregated into 23 IEA flows.
To produce fE the IEA countries are firstly aggregated into the 49 EXIOBASE countries and regions.
Secondly, the 23 flows of final energy consumption in the IEA data are split and allocated to the
70 EXIOBASE sectors in our analysis. This allocation process requires additional information and
assumptions. For most sectors, we split the relevant IEA flows proportionate to monetary output or
energy expenditure obtained from EXIOBASE. This approach has the advantage that it can implemented
easily and consistently across all countries. However, the assumption of proportionate energy and
monetary flows also introduces an amount of uncertainty into the analysis. This is especially the
case for the service sectors, as the energy consumption in all service sectors (excluding transport)
is represented in a single flow in the IEA energy balances. To address this limitation, we focus our
analysis on the UK and Germany and construct more detailed energy inputs for these countries in
the second step, paying particular attention to the service sectors. This limits the uncertainty because
service sector outputs are traded less than manufactured goods.
A second limitation of the IEA energy balances for our purposes is presented by the fact that
they are assembled based on a territorial principle, while national economic accounts and EXIOBASE
follow a residency principle [42]. This is particularly problematic for the transport sector. As a detailed
modelling of the different transport flows is beyond the resources and time available for this study, we
resolve these issues using a number of simplifying assumptions (see Supplementary Information).
In the second step we construct energy input vectors for the UK and Germany using national
data sources that offer more detail than the IEA data. For the UK these data sources include the
“Energy consumption in the UK” dataset [49] and for Germany the sources include the German energy
balances [50] as well as reports on energy use in the service [51–54] and transport sectors [55,56].
2.5. Limitations
Constructing the input-output tables, as well as the labour and energy extension vectors covering
the global economy presents a challenging task that relies on many assumptions and interpolations to
correct for gaps and inconsistencies in the data. Uncertainties in input-output results are difficult to
quantify and are not commonly reported [57]. Uncertainties arise from the methods used in constructing
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the input-output tables as well as from the construction and use of extension vectors. Peters, Davis and
Andrew [58] compare the aggregate carbon footprints for different countries calculated by different
studies. They conclude that the results are broadly consistent and that differences in the footprint results
are largely due to differences in extension vectors and differences in definitions for allocating emissions
to international trade, rather than differences in the footprinting methods and MRIO databases. Lenzen,
Wood and Wiedmann [59] conduct a Monte Carlo analyses to estimate the uncertainty associated with
carbon emissions embodied in imports and exports from the UK. They report standard deviations for
total embodied emissions in the range of 3–8%. However, they also highlight that, firstly, uncertainty at
the sectoral level can be considerably higher and secondly, that their method cannot capture systematic
errors associated with footprint production.
While our results therefore need to be considered with caution, we utilise the best data and methods
available and consider the results a useful addition to the post-growth economics literature. More
detailed information on underlying assumptions and uncertainties associated with the construction of
the EXIOBASE 3 database and the labour extension vector is provided in Stadler et al. [42], while more
information on the construction of the energy extension is available in the supplementary information
to this article.
3. Results
3.1. Comparing Embodied Energy Intensities across Sectors
Even though we are using embodied energy intensity measures, our results show that service
sectors, with the exception of the transport sector, have a lower embodied energy intensity than other
sectors (Figure 2, Table 2). In both countries, the embodied energy intensity of the service sectors
is in the range of 0.9–1.9 MJ/EUR, while the production sectors, which include the manufacturing
and mining sectors, show values between 3.5 to 7.6 MJ/EUR. An outlier is the Other Manufacturing
sector in the UK with 11.0 MJ/EUR. However, this is likely to be an overestimate as it includes all
the unclassified industrial energy use in the UK (see Supplementary Information). The Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing sector shows values in the same range as the production sectors (4.3 MJ/EUR and 5.6
MJ/EUR). In both countries the Transport sector has the highest embodied energy intensity with values
of 13.2 and 11.0 MJ/EUR. The position of the Construction sector is somewhat different in the two
countries. While embodied energy intensity in the Construction sector is in the range of the service
sectors in the UK, it sits between the service and manufacturing sectors in Germany (Table 2).
When considering the embodied energy-labour ratios the results are somewhat different from the
results for embodied energy intensities. Firstly, the clear distinction between the service sectors and
other sectors becomes more blurred. The Textiles, Clothes and Leather sector, the Food, Beverages
and Tobacco sector and the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing sector all have values of the energy-labour
ratio that are similar or lower than many service sectors (Table 2). In all of these three sectors,
a large proportion of the supply-chain labour inputs are performed abroad in low-wage countries
(Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A). The common perception that the production and agriculture
sectors are ‘high-energy’ is therefore partially the result of ignoring the dependence of some of these
sectors on low-wage labour in other parts of the world.
3.2. Identifying Labour-Intensive Service Sectors
To investigate the rates of change in embodied labour productivities, we only consider the final
demand from domestic sectors in the UK and Germany (see Section 2.3).
Based on our results, we identify five sectors as labour-intensive services. These include the
sectors Hotels and Restaurants, Public Administration, Health, Education and Other Services. These
five sectors show embodied energy intensities smaller than 2 MJ/EUR and rates of change in embodied
labour productivity smaller than 1% per year in both countries (Tables 2 and 3, Figure 3).
Sustainability 2020, 12, 962 10 of 25Sustainability 20, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 27 
 
Figure 2. Sectoral embodied energy intensity plotted against sectoral final demand (top row) and 
sectoral embodied energy-labour ratio plotted against sectoral labour footprint (bottom row). The 
areas covered by the rectangles represent the total energy footprint in the respective countries 
(excluding final energy footprints associated with demand for energy-producing sectors). 
3.2. Identifying Labour-Intensive Service Sectors 
To investigate the rates of change in embodied labour productivities, we only consider the final 
demand from domestic sectors in the UK and Germany (see Section 2.3). 
Based on our results, we identify five sectors as labour-intensive services. These include the 
sectors Hotels and Restaurants, Public Administration, Health, Education and Other Services. These 
five sectors show embodied energy intensities smaller than 2 MJ/EUR and rates of change in 
embodied labour productivity smaller than 1% per year in both countries (Tables 2 and 3, Figure 3). 
The remaining service sectors with low embodied energy intensity show either higher rates of 
growth in embodied labour productivity in at least one of the two countries. We will be referring to 
this group of sectors as labour-light services. The Wholesale and Retail Trade sector and the IT and 
Communications sector show consistently higher rates of growth in embodied labour productivity 
in both countries, well exceeding 2% and 3% per year respectively (Table 3, Figure 3). In contrast the 
results for the Finance and Insurance sector and the Business Services sector diverge between the two 
countries. Both these sectors show relatively high rates of growth in embodied labour productivity 
in the UK but negative rates of change Germany. 
The Finance and Insurance sector in Germany presents a strong outlier with rates of change in 
embodied labour productivity of −5.2% driven by an increase in the price index by 9.1%. This is not 
a result of the financial crisis as the rates of change in embodied labour productivity and prices 
between 1995 and 2006 are similar (Table A3, Appendix B). However, the rate of change in direct 
labour productivity of GVA is much less extreme showing −0.6% per year (Table A4, Appendix C). 
This could indicate that, for this sector, the use of the implied GVA deflator is not well suited to 
deflate final demand. This is likely to be related to the challenges associated with measuring real 
output in the sector in general [60,61]. 
Figure 2. Sectoral embodied energy intensity plotted against sectoral final demand (top row) and
sectoral embodied en rgy-labour ratio plott d against s ctoral labour footprint (bottom row). The are s
covered by the rectangl s represent the total energy footprint in the respective countries (excluding
final energy footprints asso i ted with demand for energy-p oducing sec ors).
Table 2. Embodied energy intensities, embodied energy-labour ratios and final demand share in 2011
for the 22 energy-using demand-sectors in the UK and Germany.
2011
UK DE
Demand Sector
Energy
Intensity
(MJ/EUR)
Energy/Labour
(MJ/h)
Demand
Share (%)
Energy
Intensity
(MJ/EUR)
Energy/Labour
(MJ/h)
Demand
Share (%)
Agriculture
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4.3 10 1.4 5.6 17 1.2
Production & Construction
Mineral Products 4.5 65 0.9 7.3 101 0.6
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4.3 38 4.2 4.6 49 5.4
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 5.8 30 1.7 5.5 31 1.8
Paper, printing, Publishing 4.8 79 1.3 4.4 132 1.3
Chemicals 7.4 86 1.2 7.6 143 3.1
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 5.5 78 1.1 5.3 94 1.4
Machinery, Electrical, Equipment, Computers 4.3 54 3.7 3.5 55 7.9
Transport Equipment 4.0 62 3.3 3.7 72 6.0
Other Manufacturing 11.0 128 1.8 5.8 82 2.9
Construction 1.7 39 8.8 2.9 70 8.5
Labour-light Services
Wholesale and Retail Trade 1.7 46 5.4 1.5 38 2.2
Transport 13.2 229 3.2 11.0 242 2.9
Finance and Insurance 1.0 32 4.2 1.2 38 3.6
Real Estate Activities 1.5 34 4.2 0.9 68 6.4
IT and Communication 1.0 21 3.3 1.2 42 3.0
Business Services 1.1 36 2.3 1.6 43 2.8
Labour-intensive Services
Hotels and Restaura ts 1.3 23 5.9 1.9 38 3.4
Public Administration 1.5 34 9.8 1.5 47 8.8
Health 1.5 33 11.0 1.4 49 6.3
Education 1.5 27 14.6 1.5 36 12.5
Other Services 1.9 44 6.8 1.8 61 8.1
Total * 2.6 44 100 2.9 59 100
*: Totals exclude dema d and energy and labour inputs for the energy-producing sectors, private households and
imputed rents.
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Table 3. Rates of change in embodied energy intensity and embodied labour productivity as well as in
the embodied energy-labour ratio for domestic demand sectors. Intensities represent embodied energy
and labour inputs per unit real demand (const. 2010 EUR).
Cumulative Annual Growth Rate between 1995 and 2011 (%)
UK DE
Sector Energy Intensity Labour Prod. Price Index Energy Intensity Labour Prod. Price Index
Agriculture
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing −4.7 3.3 −2.2 −3.3 2.4 −1.4
Production & Construction
Mineral Products 1.6 −2.7 2.2 −0.7 0.3 0.6
Food, Beverages and Tobacco −2.4 1.7 −0.2 −0.1 −2.0 1.3
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 0.0 3.0 −0.9 −1.8 −0.2 −0.2
Paper, printing, Publishing −1.8 2.3 −0.3 −1.9 3.0 −1.6
Chemicals −4.8 3.3 −0.9 −0.4 0.1 −0.1
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products −3.6 1.9 −0.6 −2.4 0.5 1.0
Machinery, Electrical, Equipment,
Computers −4.3 3.3 −1.8 −2.5 0.6 −1.2
Transport Equipment −4.6 3.4 −1.0 −1.5 −0.6 0.9
Other Manufacturing 0.7 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.1 1.1
Construction −0.3 −1.0 2.9 0.3 −0.7 1.2
Labour-light Services
Wholesale and Retail Trade −2.0 2.6 1.4 −3.8 2.8 −0.4
Transport −2.4 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.9
Finance and Insurance −4.5 3.5 2.0 6.0 −5.2 9.1
Real Estate Activities - - - - - -
IT and Communication −6.5 6.9 −3.8 −2.6 3.8 −3.8
Business Services −3.8 2.6 0.5 −0.2 −1.3 0.8
Labour-intensive Services
Hotels and Restaurants −1.4 0.0 1.6 −0.9 0.9 2.2
Public Administration −1.6 −0.5 2.6 −2.1 0.8 0.9
Health −0.8 −2.5 4.9 −0.9 −1.3 2.2
Education −0.7 0.6 1.8 −1.0 0.1 0.3
Other Services −0.7 0.0 3.6 −1.0 −0.3 1.6
Total domestic demand −2.3 0.8 1.5 −1.1 −0.1 0.7Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 27 
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The remaining service sectors with low embodied energy intensity show either higher rates of
growth in embodied labour productivity in at least one of the two countries. We will be referring to
this group of sectors as labour-light services. The Wholesale and Retail Trade sector and the IT and
Communications sector show consistently higher rates of growth in embodied labour productivity in
both countries, well exceeding 2% and 3% per year respectively (Table 3, Figure 3). In contrast the
results for the Finance and Insurance sector and the Business Services sector diverge between the two
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countries. Both these sectors show relatively high rates of growth in embodied labour productivity in
the UK but negative rates of change Germany.
The Finance and Insurance sector in Germany presents a strong outlier with rates of change in
embodied labour productivity of −5.2% driven by an increase in the price index by 9.1%. This is
not a result of the financial crisis as the rates of change in embodied labour productivity and prices
between 1995 and 2006 are similar (Table A3, Appendix B). However, the rate of change in direct
labour productivity of GVA is much less extreme showing −0.6% per year (Table A4, Appendix C).
This could indicate that, for this sector, the use of the implied GVA deflator is not well suited to deflate
final demand. This is likely to be related to the challenges associated with measuring real output in the
sector in general [60,61].
The low rates of direct labour productivity growth in the labour-intensive service sectors is often
contrasted with high rates of direct labour productivity growth in the manufacturing, transport and
agriculture sectors [26,62]. However, our results using supply-chain perspective only fit this pattern in
the UK but not in Germany.
In the UK, the production sectors, the Transport sector, as well as the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
sector show rates of growth in embodied labour productivity that are considerably higher than in the
labour-intensive services, ranging from 1.6% to 3.4% per year (Table 3, Figure 3a). The only exception is
the Mineral Products sector, which records a considerable reduction in embodied labour productivity
over the time period studied.
The results for Germany differ considerably from the UK. Most strikingly the production sectors
as well as the Transport sector show only very low growth rates or even reductions in embodied labour
productivity over the time period studied (Table 3). The only exception is the sector Paper, Printing
and Publishing which shows a rate of change in the embodied labour productivity of 3% per year.
Similar to the UK, the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing sector also shows relatively high rates of growth
in embodied labour productivity of 2.4% per year.
The low rates of growth in embodied labour productivity in the German production sectors are not
a result of low growth in the direct labour productivity of the German production sectors themselves.
Calculating the growth of direct labour productivity, in the form of GVA in constant 2010 prices per
hour of work, shows relatively high and positive rates of growth in the German manufacturing sectors
over the same time period (Table A4, Appendix C). The low rates of embodied labour productivity
growth are therefore the result of low direct labour productivity growth in other parts of the supply
chain offsetting the direct labour productivity growth in German production sectors. A similar effect
can also be observed for the UK, with direct labour productivity growth rates in the production sectors
being higher than the growth in embodied labour productivity (Table A4, Appendix C). However,
the effect is weaker so that the embodied rates of growth are still relatively large and positive for
the UK.
The time period covered by our results includes the financial crisis starting in 2008, which could
have a distorting impact on our results. We therefore conducted the same analysis covering only the
time period from 1995 to 2006. While restricting the time period changes the results for some sectors,
especially some UK manufacturing sectors, the overall patterns are very similar to the ones described
for the full time period (Figures A1 and A2 and Table A3, Appendix B).
We can now compare the importance of the different sector groups in the energy footprint, labour
footprint and final demand of the two countries. Such a comparison reveals some common features
across both countries (Figure 4). The share of the two service sector groups makes up the majority
of final demand, but their combined share in the energy and labour footprints is much smaller. Of
the two service sector groups, the labour-intensive services take up a considerably bigger share than
the labour-light services in final demand and the labour footprint. The difference between the energy
footprint shares of the labour-intensive services and the labour-light services is much smaller, because
the labour-light service sectors include the large energy footprint of the transport sector. The main
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difference between the two countries is the related to the sector group Production & Construction,
which has considerably bigger share in Germany across all three categories.
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3.3. Evidence of Baumol’s Cost Disease in Low-Energy Sectors
Baumol [30] highlights that the cost disease might have negative environmental consequences if
the environmentally damaging products from sectors of high environmental impact and high labour
productivity growth get continuously cheaper compared to the services provided by low-energy
services with low labour productivity growth. This has important implications for the labour-intensive
services proposed for a post-growth economy, as these would fall into the latter category.
To test Baumol’s suggestion, we investigate the relationship between the embodied energy-labour
ratio and the rate of change in the price index. We use the embodied energy-labour ratio instead of the
embodied energy intensity because the former can be calculated independent of the price index.
We find that the results for the UK largely support Baumol’s suggestion. The labour-intensive
service sectors, as well as the Construction sector, show low embodied energy-labour ratios combined
with relatively high rates of price inflation, ranging from 1.6% to 4.9% per year. In contrast, the
production sectors as well as the Transport sector and the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing sector show
higher energy-labour ratios combined with falling prices (Figure 5a, Table 3). Exceptions to this pattern
are the sectors Mineral Products and Other Manufacturing, which show increases in prices despite
high embodied energy-labour ratios. For the labour-light service sectors the results are mixed. They
show a wide range of price inflation rates ranging from −3.8% per year in IT and Communications to
low rates of increase in Business Services (0.5%) and higher rates in Wholesale and Retail Trade (1.4%)
and Finance and Insurance (2.0%).
For Germany, the results are less clear cut. Overall the rates of price inflation in the labour-intensive
services are much lower than in the UK, ranging from 0.3% to 2.2% per year. The rates of price inflation
in the labour-intensive service sectors are also not distinctly higher than the rates in many of the
production sectors, with the latter exhibiting a wide range of values from −1.6% to 1.3% (Figure 5b).
The lack of a clear distinction in price inflation rates between labour-intensive services and production
sectors is not surprising given that there is also less of a distinction in the rates of change in embodied
labour productivity, discussed in Section 3.2. Similar to the UK the labour-light services show a wide
range of price inflation rates ranging from falling prices in IT and Communications (−3.8%) and
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Wholesale and Retail Trade (−0.4%), over low rates of increase in Business Services (0.8%) to extremely
high rates in Finance and Insurance (9.1%).Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 27 
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4. Discussion
4.1. Comparing our Results to the Literature
To our knowledge, there are o other studies that compare embodied energy intensity to growth
rates of embodie labour productivity across sectors. Gazheli, van den Bergh and Antal [18] compare
embodied carbon intensity with irect labour roductivity growth across sectors in Germany, Spain
and Denmark. They do not find evidence for a correlation between embodied carb i tensity and
direct labour productivity growth in an of the countries. Our results would suggest that this lack
of a correlation could be due to the fact that some of the labour-light services show relatively low
levels of embodied energy intensity with relatively high rates of growth in embodied or direct labour
productivity. Jackson et al. [19] briefl compare the levels (but not growth rates) of embodied GHG
intensities and embodied labour intensity across sectors in the UK or Canada. They highlight that the
personal and social services sector provides a very high level of embodied labour intensity with a low
level of embodied GHG intensity.
We can also compare our results to the literature on Baumol’s cost disease, which includes a
discussion on which s rvice sectors can be considered to be part of th ‘stagnant’ group of sectors
with l w potential labour roductivity growth. Our results are similar to other empiric l assess ents,
even though the other studies use a conventional rather han a supply-chain perspective. Using n
analysis of different direct labour productivity measures, Baumol et al. [33] i entify the following
servi e secto s in the US o be stagnant according to the majority of measures: finance and insurance;
hotels, personal and repair; auto repair and s rvice; movies and amusement; medical, educational
and non-profit; governm t enterprises; government industry. In a more recent study, Maroto and
Rubalcaba [62] determine different rates f direct labour prod ctivity growth in different EU service
sector and estimate low or negative rates of direct labour productivity growth (< 1% per year) in the
sectors hotels and restaurants, real estate activities, business servic s an soci l & personal serv ces.
They stimate a slightly higher rate of direct labour productivity growth in the public sector (1.67% per
year), but this is still considerably lower than the direct labour productivity growth they estimate for
the manufacturing secto s (5.93% per year).
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Jackson [10] lists the activities of “nutrition, education, care, maintenance and repair, recreation,
craft, creativity, culture” (p. 220) as examples of labour-intensive services desirable for a post-growth
economy. The five broad service sectors that we identify as being labour-intensive encompass all of
these activities. Our results therefore support the assumptions in the post-growth literature that these
activities could potentially be sectors for job creation in a post-growth economy.
The Construction sector presents an interesting case. In both countries it is showing relatively
low values of embodied energy intensity. In addition, it is showing negative rates of change in
embodied labour productivity, which means that it largely fulfils the two criteria we applied to identify
labour-intensive services. However, while our estimated values of embodied energy intensity in
the sector are quite low, the construction sector is generally considered to have high environmental
intensities with regard to other environmental impacts, especially with regard to overall material
use and GHG emissions from cement production [63]. We have therefore not included it in the
category of labour-intensive services. Nevertheless, our results highlight that construction activities
are labour-intensive and that the sector could therefore provide an important source of jobs in a
post-growth economy, as long as it can be made less environmentally intensive, for example in the area
of retrofitting houses or in the construction of low-impact housing.
4.2. Potential Energy Savings from Structural Change
Our results confirm that most service sectors are less energy intensive than manufacturing and
transport sectors, even when calculated using a supply-chain perspective. The picture still holds
when the embodied energy-labour ratio is considered, although the distinction is not quite as clear,
with some manufacturing sectors showing values similar to service sectors. Overall, a shift in final
demand away from sectors with high embodied energy intensity towards labour-intensive services
would therefore reduce the energy footprint of final demand in Germany and the UK.
To estimate the potential magnitude of energy footprint reductions we can imagine a radical
scenario in which the share in final demand of all sectors with high embodied energy intensity
(>3 MJ/EUR) in 2011 is reduced by half, this includes the production sectors as well as the Transport
sector and the Agriculture, Forestry Fishing sector. The value of demand reduced in the energy-intensive
sectors is redistributed to the five labour-intensive service sectors, according to their shares in demand
in 2011, so that overall demand is unchanged. We can then calculate new, hypothetical, energy and
labour footprints using the embodied energy and labour intensities for 2011. Such a hypothetical
scenario would reduce the total energy footprint of the sectors covered in this study by about 22%
in both Germany and the UK. As our study excludes energy consumption for residential purposes
and private transport, the reductions in the total final energy footprint in the UK and Germany would
be smaller.
Such reductions in energy footprints would constitute an important step towards reducing
environmental impacts. However, they are relatively small, given that the scenario describes structural
changes that are very large by historic standards. In addition, the scenario is very simple and might not
be achievable in practice as some categories of energy-intensive demand might not be easily reduced
because they constitute important human needs, such as food or clothing.
For a post-growth economy, it is not only the overall energy footprint that needs to be reduced
by structural change, but also the overall energy-labour ratio. In our scenario the overall embodied
energy-labour ratio would be reduced by 8% and 11% in Germany and the UK respectively. The potential
contribution that structural changes towards labour-intensive services can make to lower the embodied
energy-labour ratio is therefore even smaller than the one for the energy footprints. However, a large
part of the labour footprint for both countries is employed abroad. The ratio of domestic and foreign
labour inputs in the supply chain varies significantly between sectors, with the production sectors
and the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing sector generally being associated with larger proportions of
labour employed abroad (Tables A1 and A2, Appendix A). Any shifts towards labour intensive services
imagined in the post-growth literature would therefore reduce the energy-labour ratio within the UK
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and Germany and increase employment domestically, even if it does not lead to big changes in the
aggregate embodied energy-labour ratio.
The sustainability challenge requires us to find ways to provide for human needs within planetary
boundaries. Overall, our results indicate that structural changes towards labour-intensive services
can make a contribution to the goals of a post-growth economy and to addressing the sustainability
challenge, by reducing energy consumption and creating employment. It is difficult to define how
much final energy consumption has to be reduced in developed countries to ensure environmental
sustainability. However, we would suggest that the magnitudes of energy savings discussed in this
section on their own are unlikely to be sufficient for avoiding environmental crises from climate change
and other environmental impacts.
Therefore, it is important to focus on other strategies that can reduce energy use across sectors.
One way to achieve this is to increase policy efforts to reduce their energy intensity. This is especially
relevant for the service sectors which have generally lagged behind other sectors with regard to energy
intensity reductions [27,64]. An important question for the post-growth literature is then how such
efforts to innovate and reduce energy intensity interact with labour productivity, as there is evidence
that increased efforts for environmental innovation increase productivity [65]. Another possibility
to reduce energy consumption would be through policies for targeted reductions in unnecessary
economic production. This is likely to be most effective in production sectors that have a high energy
intensity and already have exhausted many options for easy energy intensity improvements. In those
sectors related to land-use change, such as agriculture or forestry, another important objective for the
post-growth economy would be to restore the capacity of the land to provide important ecosystem
services [66].
Nevertheless, even if the energy savings of high-level shifts towards labour-intensive that we
examine here are limited, there might still be other reasons why such shifts towards labour-intensive
services have to form an important part of the post-growth transition. Such reasons can include the
ability of these sectors to provide meaningful and socially useful work.
4.3. Baumol’s Cost Disease as a Barrier to the Post-Growth Transition
The theory of Baumol’s cost disease rests on a stylised division of the economy in sectors with high
labour productivity and sectors with low labour productivity growth. Our results for the UK largely fit
with Baumol’s theory. There are high rates of growth in embodied labour productivity in production
and the labour-light services compared to low rates of growth in the labour-intensive services. We find
relative price increase in labour-intensive service sectors relative to high-energy production sectors.
In contrast the results for Germany show stagnating value in embodied labour productivity in many of
the production and labour-light service sectors that are similar to those in the labour-intensive services.
The diverging results with regard to embodied labour productivity in the production sectors in
Germany and the UK highlight that it is important to go beyond the stylised division and take into
account local context and complexity. This complexity has also been highlighted in other research on the
topic [35,36]. The adoption of a supply-chain perspective demonstrates one aspect of this complexity,
namely the interconnectedness of the different conventional sectors. Most final products rely on a mix
of labour-intensive and non-labour-intensive activities, which shapes the rates of embodied labour
productivity improvements. As our results demonstrate, this can lead to considerable differences in
the rates of change of labour productivity between direct and embodied measures.
Nevertheless, drawing on our results for the UK and the wider evidence in the literature,
we consider that Baumol’s cost disease should be taken seriously when developing strategies for a
transition to a post-growth economy. At first glance it might appear that Baumol’s cost disease already
supports a post-growth transition, as it leads to a shift of labour and demand in current prices towards
labour-intensive services and might even act to reduce economic growth. However, as a general
tendency we would suggest that Baumol’s cost disease would act as a barrier to the post-growth
transition for two reasons. Firstly, the shift in demand towards labour-intensive services is largely a
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result of price changes and not mirrored in real production. The share of energy-intensive production
sectors does not decline strongly in real terms and hence energy demand is not strongly reduced by
these changes [28].
Secondly, as Baumol [30] himself argues, some of the fundamental features of the cost disease
are working against sustainability concerns. Manufactured goods, which have a high direct energy
intensity, are becoming ever cheaper compared to labour intensive services with low direct energy
intensity. In addition, the rising relative costs of repair foster a throw-away society. The only reason
that Baumol’s cost disease produces a shift in labour and output in current prices towards some
labour-intensive services is the fact that these services are so important that demand for them is kept
up despite increasing relative prices and costs (e.g., health care, education). Other labour-intensive
services, which are not essential, such as theatre, become luxury products or are completely priced
out of the market [30]. Even those labour-intensive services that are seen as essential and are often
publicly provided (e.g., health care) face a continuous uphill battle from rising costs which need to be
constantly justified.
Post-growth economics proposes that a sustainable economy will require a much larger share
of activities to be concentrated in labour-intensive services. Baumol’s cost disease suggests that
a shift of economic activity towards such sectors would provide considerable challenges as these
sectors will constantly struggle with rising relative costs and prices. An important question for
the post-growth economics literature is therefore how to change the economic system to reduce the
disadvantage that labour-intensive services face from Baumol’s cost disease. This presents a difficult
challenge as Baumol’s cost disease relates to some fundamental features of our market economy, such
as competition and the important role of labour costs. Our analysis shows that many of the sectors
showing low or negative price inflation also have a higher energy-labour ratio. A reform of the tax
system that moves taxes away from labour and onto energy use or GHG emissions could therefore
make a start in addressing the disadvantage faced by labour-intensive services. Such tax reforms are
a common suggestion in the post-growth literature [67]. Other policies could be targeted at specific
labour-intensive services, for example obligations for companies to offer repair services together with
their products. Another possible way to increase labour-intensive services would be to increase the
non-market provision of such services through communities or the state, especially where such services
are already provided in a non-market environment.
4.4. Structural Change and Economic Growth are Intertwined
Our results for Germany and the UK do not only show differences with regard to rates of change
and embodied labour productivity in production sectors, but also the economy as a whole. The
embodied labour productivity of all demand sectors covered in this study is essentially stagnant in
Germany, while it shows a positive rate of growth in the UK. Similarly, the overall rate of price inflation
is well below 1% in Germany but considerably higher in the UK.
The diverging results between the two countries therefore highlight another key feature of the
wider literature on structural change. This is the fact that structural change is closely linked to the
process of economic growth, as stressed by Kuznets [68]. Two of the main causes of structural change
that have been identified in the literature are differential rates of labour productivity growth in different
sectors [31] and changes in demand composition associated with rising incomes [24]. Both of these
mechanisms can be expected to operate only weakly in an economy that is not showing growth in
aggregate labour productivity, income and demand. Without high productivity growth in at least some
sectors, we also would not expect the manifestation of Baumol’s cost disease.
This raises important questions for post-growth economists as they generally envision structural
change towards labour-intensive services in a non-growing economy or even as a strategy to lower
economic growth. However, the literature on structural change so far has very little insights to offer on
how structural changes can be achieved in a non-growing economy.
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5. Conclusions
Our current economic system is not sustainable as it is increasingly destroying the ecological
life support systems of our planet. To address the sustainability challenge, we need to find ways to
rapidly reverse environmental destruction while simultaneously meeting human needs and improving
living conditions. Post-growth economists propose that structural changes in our economy away from
material production and towards labour-intensive services, such as health care, education, arts and
crafts or repair services, can make an important contribution to addressing the sustainability challenge
by reducing the environmental impact of the economy and provide meaningful jobs.
Our study produces some empirical evidence regarding the realisation of this proposal by
investigating the relationship between embodied energy intensity and embodied labour productivity of
final demand sectors in the UK and Germany between 1995 and 2011. Specifically, we investigate three
questions, namely whether service sectors feature lower levels of embodied energy intensity than other
sectors, which service sectors can be considered labour-intensive and whether these labour-intensive
service sectors might be affected by Baumol’s cost disease. Our results confirm some of the assumptions
in the post-growth economics literature but also raise some important challenges.
Firstly, we confirm that service sectors show lower values of embodied final energy intensity
than other sectors and we identify five sectors as labour-intensive, combing low levels of embodied
energy intensity with low rates of growth in embodied labour productivity. These include Hotels
and Restaurants, Public Administration, Education, Health Care and Other Services. Given the lower
embodied energy intensity of these sectors, structural changes towards these labour-intensive service
sectors would likely reduce the energy footprint of the German and UK economies.
Secondly, however, our results also suggest that the magnitude of reductions in energy footprints
that can be achieved from structural changes towards labour-intensive services are relatively small and,
on their own, are unlikely to be sufficient for reducing the environmental impacts of the respective
economies to sustainable levels. This is the case because large fractions of demand as well as the
labour footprint are already concentrated in sectors with low embodied energy intensity. While
labour-intensive service sectors provide very important services for human flourishing, increasing their
share in the economy is no panacea for reducing environmental impact. To achieve rapid reductions in
energy footprints it is therefore important to achieve improvements in energy intensity within sectors
as well as reductions in overall economic demand and production.
Lastly, our results highlight some potential challenges to achieving such structural changes
towards labour-intensive services for a post-growth transition. For the UK we find some support
for the theory of Baumol’s cost disease with rates of price inflation in labour-intensive services
being higher than in other sectors, especially compared to production sectors with high embodied
energy-labour ratio. Baumol’s cost disease suggests that the tendency of our economic system to chase
labour productivity improvements poses a considerable challenge to labour-intensive sectors. As it is
undesirable and/or difficult to improve labour productivity in these sectors, they face continuously
rising costs and prices relative to other sectors that are able to improve labour productivity. Such
rising costs threaten their existence in the market place or their political justification, if they are
provided publicly, and therefore provide a potential barrier to the expansion of labour-intensive
services envisioned in the post-growth literature.
For Germany we do not find evidence supporting Baumol’s cost disease as rates of growth
in embodied labour productivity and price inflation are low across the whole economy, including
the manufacturing sectors. These results highlight another challenge to the post-growth proposals,
namely the fact that structural changes are closely intertwined with the process of economic growth.
There are currently no theories to explain how structural changes might happen in an economy that is
not growing.
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Our research improves our understanding of the implications and challenges of structural changes
towards labour-intensive services. However, it also highlights some important unanswered questions
for the post-growth transition: How can we reduce the environmental impacts of labour-intensive
services even further? How can structural changes towards labour-intensive services be achieved
without further economic growth? How can we create an economic environment that allows such
labour-intensive services to flourish in the face of increasing labour productivity in other sectors?
If we are serious about fostering labour-intensive, community-based services as part of a post-growth
transition we need further research to answer these questions.
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Appendix A. Regional Distribution of Labour Footprints
Table A1. Distribution of UK sectoral labour footprints by source region (%).
Demand Sector UK Rest ofEurope
North
America
South & Central
America China
Asia and
Oceania Africa
Agriculture
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4.8 4.9 0.4 6.6 2.4 30.2 50.7
Production & Construction
Mineral Products 19.1 6.4 1.3 2.2 4.5 53.5 13.0
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 14.2 12.8 1.1 4.1 6.7 46.1 15.0
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 3.7 6.2 0.6 1.5 36.9 45.4 5.6
Paper, printing, Publishing 34.1 9.5 1.6 1.9 7.0 40.5 5.4
Chemicals 6.7 12.7 4.2 4.1 17.9 44.0 10.4
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 21.2 13.2 3.0 2.3 8.8 45.1 6.4
Machinery, Electrical, Equipment, Computers 8.5 14.1 3.5 1.8 27.5 39.2 5.4
Transport Equipment 11.4 22.1 3.1 2.3 8.3 45.8 7.0
Other Manufacturing 9.4 12.8 4.5 2.2 21.4 43.4 6.3
Construction 73.0 4.1 0.8 0.8 3.3 14.5 3.5
Labour-light Services
Wholesale and Retail Trade 85.1 5.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 5.9 2.4
Transport 32.6 11.6 2.5 2.2 4.9 33.8 12.4
Finance and Insurance 62.9 4.5 1.9 1.7 2.9 20.3 5.8
Real Estate Activities 59.1 4.8 2.3 1.0 2.9 25.0 4.9
IT and Communication 76.9 4.3 1.0 0.5 1.7 11.7 3.8
Business Services 61.9 6.1 3.1 1.0 2.9 20.8 4.3
Labour-intensive Services
Hotels and Restaurants 28.6 7.8 3.2 1.3 14.3 22.6 22.3
Public Administration 70.0 4.0 1.4 0.8 3.0 17.0 3.7
Health 72.7 2.2 0.6 0.5 1.7 20.0 2.3
Education 62.7 3.2 1.1 0.9 3.4 25.0 3.6
Other Services 71.2 4.0 1.3 0.8 2.4 16.5 4.0
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Table A2. Distribution of German sectoral labour footprints by source region.
Demand Germany Rest ofEurope
North
America
South & Central
America China
Asia and
Oceania Africa
Agriculture
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4.5 7.5 0.4 7.8 2.9 38.4 38.6
Production & Construction
Mineral Products 12.6 10.5 1.6 3.3 5.8 53.3 13.0
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 19.8 14.1 0.8 5.8 8.1 32.4 19.0
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 2.8 11.9 0.7 2.0 34.0 41.8 6.8
Paper, printing, Publishing 27.5 22.0 2.0 1.5 6.7 33.8 6.5
Chemicals 12.4 14.3 4.8 3.3 17.0 38.6 9.6
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 20.9 24.1 1.6 2.3 7.0 37.2 6.9
Machinery, Electrical, Equipment, Computers 12.7 17.0 2.6 1.9 23.9 36.4 5.6
Transport Equipment 14.8 24.8 4.2 4.0 10.2 33.7 8.2
Other Manufacturing 22.0 23.5 1.6 2.0 13.5 30.9 6.5
Construction 53.2 10.5 1.2 1.0 6.3 22.6 5.2
Labour-light Services
Wholesale and Retail Trade 69.9 15.5 0.5 0.8 1.2 7.7 4.4
Transport 19.9 13.3 3.0 1.6 5.2 42.9 14.2
Finance and Insurance 59.2 5.0 2.4 1.9 4.0 21.3 6.3
Real Estate Activities 61.5 6.2 2.0 0.9 3.8 20.6 4.9
IT and Communication 58.8 7.7 2.1 0.6 2.9 19.9 8.0
Business Services 72.8 4.5 4.3 0.7 2.2 12.8 2.8
Labour-intensive Services
Hotels and Restaurants 40.6 7.0 4.9 1.8 11.7 17.2 16.8
Public Administration 67.2 5.4 2.9 1.1 3.4 14.6 5.3
Health 80.9 3.3 1.5 0.5 1.8 9.1 2.8
Education 66.1 5.8 1.4 1.7 4.3 15.3 5.4
Other Services 65.9 5.1 1.6 0.8 4.2 17.2 5.2
Appendix B. Results Excluding the Financial Crisis
Table A3. Rates of change in embodied energy intensity and embodied labour productivity as well as
in the embodied energy-labour ratio for domestic demand sectors between 1995 and 2006. Intensities
represent embodied energy and labour inputs per unit real demand (const. 2010 EUR).
Cumulative Annual Growth Rate between 1995 and 2006 (%)
UK DE
Sector EnergyIntensity
Labour
Prod. Price Index
Energy
Intensity
Labour
Prod. Price Index
Agriculture
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing −6.1 4.7 −2.2 −2.8 3.1 −1.1
Production & Construction
Mineral Products 3.7 −2.6 3.1 0.5 −0.5 −0.5
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.0 −1.0 2.7 −0.3 −1.0 0.9
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 1.1 3.4 0.3 −2.0 −0.5 −0.2
Paper, printing, Publishing 1.5 0.5 3.3 0.5 1.3 −0.8
Chemicals −4.1 3.3 −0.8 −1.6 0.8 −0.8
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products −4.8 3.0 0.1 −2.7 0.7 0.5
Machinery, Electrical, Equipment, Computers −4.0 3.2 −0.5 −1.7 0.3 −1.6
Transport Equipment −3.4 2.3 0.9 −0.5 −2.0 1.3
Other Manufacturing 1.0 −0.3 3.5 0.3 −0.1 0.8
Construction −0.4 −0.8 6.2 0.0 −0.2 −0.2
Labour-light Services
Wholesale and Retail Trade −2.6 3.3 3.6 −1.0 1.8 −0.6
Transport −2.0 1.3 1.9 0.5 −0.1 0.9
Finance and Insurance −5.9 5.1 2.1 8.9 −6.5 12.0
Real Estate Activities −2.9 1.2 1.9 −0.9 1.3 −0.6
IT and Communication −7.7 8.4 −3.0 −0.7 3.1 −3.3
Business Services −3.6 2.4 3.2 2.1 −1.4 0.6
Labour-intensive Services
Hotels and Restaurants −1.0 0.0 5.1 1.0 0.3 2.4
Public Administration −1.4 −0.9 4.8 −1.5 0.2 0.7
Health −0.9 −2.5 7.3 −1.5 −0.8 1.9
Education 0.7 −0.3 4.6 −1.2 0.1 0.2
Other Services 0.0 −0.6 6.3 0.3 −0.8 1.6
Total domestic demand −1.6 0.6 3.7 −0.9 0.1 0.5
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Appendix C. Direct Labour Productivity Growth
Table A4. Sectoral rates of change in direct labour productivity in the UK and Germany between 1995
and 2011.
Sectors Cumulative Rate of Change in Direct Labour Productivity * (%)
UK DE
Agriculture
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4.1 4.3
Production & Construction
Mineral Products −1.2 3.3
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 3.7 −1.3
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 4.8 3.7
Paper, printing, Publishing 3.0 6.4
Chemicals 6.4 2.1
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 3.1 2.0
Machinery, Electrical, Equipment, Computers 5.6 4.2
Transport Equipment 5.4 3.3
Other Manufacturing 3.2 2.5
Construction −0.2 0.1
Labour-light Services
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2.6 2.0
Transport 3.0 4.6
Finance and Insurance 6.6 −0.6
Real Estate Activities - -
IT and Communication 7.9 4.2
Business Services 3.8 −2.2
Labour-intensive Services
Hotels and Restaurants 1.0 1.9
Public Administration −0.6 1.7
Health −2.8 −1.7
Education 1.1 1.0
Other Services 0.8 0.2
Total 2.4 1.7
*: Direct labour productivity is calculated as sectoral GVA (in constant 2010 prices) per hour of work in the sector,
using data from EXIOBASE V3.4 and GVA deflators from Eurostat.
References
1. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future.
Available online: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf
(accessed on 10 January 2020).
2. United Nations. Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Available online: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%
20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (accessed on 10 January 2020).
3. Rockström, J.; Steffen, W.; Noone, K. A safe operating space for humanity. Nature 2009, 461, 472. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
4. Steffen, W.; Richardson, K.; Rockström, J.; Cornell, S.; Fetzer, I.; Bennett, E.; Biggs, R.; Carpenter, S. Planetary
boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet. Science 2015, 347, 1259855. [CrossRef]
5. Hickel, J.; Kallis, G. Is Green Growth Possible? New Polit. Econ. 2019. [CrossRef]
6. Opršal, Z.; Harmácˇek, J.; Pavlík, P.; Machar, I. What factors can influence the expansion of protected areas
around the world in the context of international environmental and development goals? Probl. Ekorozw.
2018, 13, 145–157.
7. O’Neill, D.W.; Fanning, A.L.; Lamb, W.F.; Steinberger, J.K. A good life for all within planetary boundaries.
Nat. Sustain. 2018, 1, 88. [CrossRef]
8. Raupach, M.R.; Marland, G.; Ciais, P.; Le Quéré, C.; Canadell, J.G.; Klepper, G.; Field, C.B. Global and
regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2007, 104, 10288–10293. [CrossRef]
9. Peters, G.P.; Andrew, R.M.; Canadell, J.G.; Fuss, S.; Jackson, R.B.; Korsbakken, J.I.; Le Quéré, C.;
Nakicenovic, N.; Marshall, D.P.; Ambaum, M.H.P.; et al. Key indicators to track current progress and future
ambition of the Paris Agreement. Nat. Clim. Chang. 2017, 7, 79–81. [CrossRef]
10. Jackson, T. Prosperity without Growth, 2nd ed.; Routledge: Oxon, UK, 2017.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 962 23 of 25
11. D’Alisa, G.; Demaria, F.; Kallis, G. Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era; Routledge: London, UK, 2015.
12. Kallis, G. In defence of degrowth. Ecol. Econ. 2011, 70, 873–880. [CrossRef]
13. Daly, H.E. Sustainable Development: From Concept and Theory to Operational Principles. Popul. Dev. Rev.
1990, 16, 25–43. [CrossRef]
14. O’Neill, D.W. What Should Be Held Steady in a Steady-State Economy? Interpreting Daly’s Definition at the
National Level. J. Ind. Ecol. 2015, 19, 552–563. [CrossRef]
15. Jackson, T. New economy. In Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era; D’Alisa, G., Demaria, F., Kallis, G., Eds.;
Routledge: London, UK, 2015.
16. Kallis, G.; Kerschner, C.; Martinez-Alier, J. The economics of degrowth. Ecol. Econ. 2012, 84, 172–180.
[CrossRef]
17. Sakai, M.; Owen, A.; Barrett, J. The UK’s emissions and employment footprints: Exploring the trade-offs.
Sustainability 2017, 9, 1242. [CrossRef]
18. Gazheli, A.; Van Den Bergh, J.; Antal, M. How realistic is green growth? Sectoral-level carbon intensity
versus productivity. J. Clean. Prod. 2016, 129, 449–467. [CrossRef]
19. Jackson, T.; Drake, B.; Victor, P.A.; Kratena, K.; Sommer, M. Foundations for an Ecological Macroeconomics:
Literature review and model development. Available online: https://www.wifo.ac.at/jart/prj3/wifo/
main.jart?rel=en&content-id=1436057251192&publikation_id=47497&detail-view=yes&sid=2 (accessed on
10 January 2020).
20. Wiedmann, T.; Minx, J.; Barrett, J.; Wackernagel, M. Allocating ecological footprints to final consumption
categories with input-output analysis. Ecol. Econ. 2006, 56, 28–48. [CrossRef]
21. Barrett, J.; Peters, G.; Wiedmann, T.; Scott, K.; Lenzen, M.; Roelich, K.; Le Quéré, C. Consumption-based
GHG emission accounting: A UK case study. Clim. Policy 2013, 13, 451–470. [CrossRef]
22. Wiedmann, T.O.; Schandl, H.; Lenzen, M.; Moran, D.; Suh, S.; West, J.; Kanemoto, K. The material footprint
of nations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2015, 112, 6271–6276. [CrossRef]
23. Lan, J.; Malik, A.; Lenzen, M.; McBain, D.; Kanemoto, K. A structural decomposition analysis of global
energy footprints. Appl. Energy 2016, 163, 436–451. [CrossRef]
24. Pasinetti, L.L. Structural Economic Dynamics: A Theory of the Economic Consequences of Human Learning;
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1993.
25. Pasinetti, L.L. Structural Change and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Essay on the Dynamics of the Wealth of
Nations; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1981.
26. Mulder, P.; de Groot, H.L.F. International Comparisons of Sectoral Energy- and Labour-Productivity Performance;
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No 2004-007/3; Tinbergen Institute: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2004.
27. Mulder, P.; de Groot, H.L.F.; Pfeiffer, B. Dynamics and determinants of energy intensity in the service sector:
A cross-country analysis, 1980–2005. Ecol. Econ. 2014, 100, 1–15. [CrossRef]
28. Henriques, S.T.; Kander, A. The modest environmental relief resulting from the transition to a service
economy. Ecol. Econ. 2010, 70, 271–282. [CrossRef]
29. Druckman, A.; Mair, S. Wellbeing, Care and Robots: Prospects for Good Work in the Health and Social Care Sector;
CUSP Working Paper No 21; Centre for Understanding Sustainable Prosperity: Surrey, UK, 2019.
30. Baumol, W.J. The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health Care Doesn’t; Yale University Press:
New Haven, CT, USA, 2012.
31. Baumol, W.J. Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis. Am. Econ. Rev. 1967,
57, 415–426.
32. Baumol, W.J.; Bowen, W. On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their Economic Problems. Am. Econ. Rev.
1965, 55, 495–502.
33. Baumol, W.J.; Batey Blackman, S.A.; Wolff, E.N. Unbalanced Growth Revisited: Asymptotic Stagnancy and
New Evidence. Am. Econ. Rev. 1985, 75, 806–817.
34. Nordhaus, W.D. Baumol’s diseases: A macroeconomic perspective. BE J. Macroecon. 2006, 8, 1–39.
35. Fernandez, R.; Palazuelos, E. European Union Economies Facing “Baumol’s Disease” within the Service
Sector. J. Common Mark. Stud. 2012, 50, 231–249. [CrossRef]
36. Hartwig, J. Testing the Baumol-Nordhaus model with EU KLEMS data. Rev. Income Wealth 2011, 57, 471–489.
[CrossRef]
37. Oh, W.; Kim, K. The baumol diseases and the Korean economy. Emerg. Mark. Financ. Trade 2015, 51,
S214–S223. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2020, 12, 962 24 of 25
38. Hartwig, J. Structural change, aggregate demand and employment dynamics in the OECD, 1970–2010.
Struct. Chang. Econ. Dyn. 2015, 34, 36–45. [CrossRef]
39. Hartwig, J. Testing the growth effects of structural change. Struct. Chang. Econ. Dyn. 2012, 23, 11–24.
[CrossRef]
40. Miller, R.E.; Blair, P.D. Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions; Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, UK, 2009.
41. Owen, A.; Brockway, P.; Brand-Correa, L.; Bunse, L.; Sakai, M.; Barrett, J. Energy consumption-based accounts:
A comparison of results using different energy extension vectors. Appl. Energy 2017, 190, 464–473. [CrossRef]
42. Stadler, K.; Wood, R.; Bulavskaya, T.; Södersten, C.J.; Simas, M.; Schmidt, S.; Usubiaga, A.;
Acosta-Fernández, J.; Kuenen, J.; Bruckner, M.; et al. EXIOBASE 3: Developing a Time Series of Detailed
Environmentally Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output Tables. J. Ind. Ecol. 2018, 22, 502–515. [CrossRef]
43. Brockway, P.E.; Owen, A.; Brand-Correa, L.I.; Hardt, L. Estimation of global final stage
energy-return-on-investment for fossil fuels with comparison to renewable energy sources. Nat. Energy 2019,
4, 612–621. [CrossRef]
44. Gujarati, D. Basic Econometrics, 3rd ed.; McGraw-Hill: New York, NY, USA, 1995.
45. Peck, J.; Theodore, N. Variegated capitalism. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 2007, 31, 731–772. [CrossRef]
46. Eurostat. Eurostat Database 2018; Eurostat: Luxembourg, 2018.
47. Lequiller, F.; Blades, D. Distinguishing between volume and price increases. In Understanding the National
Accounts; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2014; pp. 47–77.
48. IEA. IEA World Energy Statistics 2018 Edition: Database Documentation; IEA: Paris, France, 2018.
49. Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy. Energy Consumption in the UK; Department for
Business Energy & Industrial Strategy: London, UK, 2016.
50. AG Energiebilanzen Bilanzen 1990–2017. Available online: https://ag-energiebilanzen.de/7-0-Bilanzen-1990-
-2017.html (accessed on 7 February 2019).
51. Schlomann, B.; Steinbach, J.; Kleeberger, H.; Geiger, B.; Pich, A.; Gruber, E.; Mai, M.; Gerspacher, A.;
Schiller, W. Energieverbrauch des Sektors Gewerbe, Handel, Dienstleistungen (GHD) in Deutschland für die Jahre
2007 bis 2010; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technology (BMWi): Berlin, Germany, 2013.
52. Schlomann, B.; Gruber, E.; Geiger, B.; Kleeberger, H.; Wehmhörner, U.; Herzog, T.; Konopka, D.-M.
Energieverbrauch des Sektors Gewerbe, Handel, Dienstleistungen (GHD) für die Jahre 2004 bis 2006;
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi): Berlin, Germany, 2009.
53. Schlomann, B.; Gruber, E.; Eichhammer, W.; Kling, N.; Diekmann, J.; Ziesing, H.-J.; Rieke, H.; Wittke, F.;
Herzog, T.; Barbosa, M.; et al. Energieverbrauch der privaten Haushalte und des Sektors Gewerbe, Handel,
Dienstleistungen (GHD); Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit: Berlin, Germany, 2004.
54. Geiger, B.; Gruber, E.; Megele, W. Energieverbrauch und Einsparung in Gewerbe, Handel und Dienstleistung;
Springer Verlag: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 1999.
55. Adler, W. Berichtsmodul Verkehr und Umwelt: Band 14 der Schriftenreihe Beiträge zu den Umweltökonomischen
Gesamtrechnungen; Statistisches Bundesamt: Wiesbaden, Germany, 2005.
56. Statistisches Bundesamt. (Destatis) Umweltökonomische Gesamtrechnungen: Transportleistungen und
Energieverbrauch im Straßenverkehr 2005–2016; Statistisches Bundesamt: Wiesbaden, Germany, 2018.
57. Owen, A.; Steen-Olsen, K.; Barrett, J.; Wiedmann, T.; Lenzen, M. A structural decomposition approach to
comparing MRIO databases. Econ. Syst. Res. 2014, 26, 262–283. [CrossRef]
58. Peters, G.P.; Davis, S.J.; Andrew, R. A synthesis of carbon in international trade. Biogeosciences 2012, 9,
3247–3276. [CrossRef]
59. Lenzen, M.; Wood, R.; Wiedmann, T. Uncertainty Analysis for Multi-Region Input-Output Models—A Case
Study of the UK’s Carbon Footprint. Econ. Syst. Res. 2010, 22, 43–63. [CrossRef]
60. Inklaar, R.; Timmer, M.P.; van Ark, B. Market services productivity across Europe and the US. Econ. Policy
2008, 23, 140–194.
61. Christophers, B. Making finance productive. Econ. Soc. 2011, 40, 112–140. [CrossRef]
62. Maroto, A.; Rubalcaba, L. Services productivity revisited. Serv. Ind. J. 2008, 28, 337–353. [CrossRef]
63. Giesekam, J.; Barrett, J.; Taylor, P.; Owen, A. The greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation options for
materials used in UK construction. Energy Build. 2014, 78, 202–214. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2020, 12, 962 25 of 25
64. Hardt, L.; Owen, A.; Brockway, P.; Heun, M.K.; Barrett, J.; Taylor, P.G.; Foxon, T.J. Untangling the drivers of
energy reduction in the UK productive sectors: Efficiency or offshoring? Appl. Energy 2018, 223, 124–133.
[CrossRef]
65. Aldieri, L.; Kotsemir, M.; Paolo Vinci, C. Environmental innovations and productivity: Empirical evidence
from Russian regions. Resour. Policy 2019, 101444. [CrossRef]
66. Pechanec, V.; Kilianová, H.; Tangwa, E.; Vondráková, A.; Machar, I. What is the development capacity for
provision of ecosystem services in the Czech Republic? Sustainability 2019, 11, 4273. [CrossRef]
67. Cosme, I.; Santos, R.; O’Neill, D.W. Assessing the degrowth discourse: A review and analysis of academic
degrowth policy proposals. J. Clean. Prod. 2017, 149, 321–334. [CrossRef]
68. Kuznets, S. Modern Economic Growth: Findings and reflections. Am. Econ. Rev. 1973, 63, 247–258.
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
